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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Kimberly Susan Krieg 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Accounting 
 
June 2019 
 
Title: Does the Diversification of Tax Strategies affect Tax Risk? 
 
 
I investigate the effect that the number of different tax strategies employed by a 
public company has on the relation between measures of corporate tax avoidance and 
measures of risk. Prior studies have generally failed to find a relation between measures of 
overall firm risk (such as stock return volatility) and measures of corporate tax avoidance 
(such as low effective tax rates). One possible reason for this empirical result is the failure 
to consider the role that the diversification of tax risk, through utilization of a portfolio of 
different tax avoidance strategies, might have on reducing tax risk and, as a result, on 
reducing overall firm risk. I create a broad measure of diversification based on five sources 
of tax benefits. Controlling for the level of tax avoidance, I regress measures of risk on 
diversification and an interaction term and find weak support that diversification reduces 
tax risk, as measured by the volatility of future cash ETRs, and mixed evidence on the 
effect of diversification on overall firm risk, as measured by the volatility of future monthly 
stock returns. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Prior studies have generally failed to find a relation between measures of overall 
firm risk (such as stock return volatility) and measures of corporate tax avoidance (such 
as low effective tax rates). I propose that one reason for this mixed evidence is that as 
firms engage in more tax avoidance, they add additional tax strategies, which has the 
effect of diversifying their tax planning.1 Drawing on portfolio theory, diversification 
reduces the overall risk of the portfolio without reducing the expected return. Considering 
tax planning as an overall portfolio of tax strategies, adding additional tax strategies 
increases the diversification and, depending on the covariance of the payoffs from the 
different strategies, may reduce overall tax risk. Thus, in this paper I investigate whether 
the diversification of tax strategies affects tax risk and, as a result, overall firm risk.2  
A significant focus of recent tax accounting research is to explain variations in 
corporate tax avoidance, and why some firms are able to exhibit lower effective tax rates 
(ETRs) than others. A number of studies show that this variation can be partially 
explained by firm characteristics such as size (Zimmerman (1983)), ownership structure 
(Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin (2010)), corporate governance (Desai, Dyck, and 
Zingales (2007)), and subsidiary locations (Dyreng and Lindsey (2009)). Others have 
reasoned that certain types of tax avoidance are more aggressive and riskier. Lisowsky, 
                                                 
1 I define a “tax strategy” as a specific plan to reduce the amount of income tax otherwise owed. I define 
the broader term “tax planning” as the overall goal to reduce the amount of income tax owed, composed of 
one or more specific tax strategies.  
2 In finance, diversification is the process of allocating capital in one’s portfolio to a mix of different 
investments in a way that reduces exposure to any one particular asset, thereby reducing overall risk. Thus, 
by this technical definition, diversification means a reduction in risk. However, in applying this concept to 
a tax avoidance setting, I use a more general definition of the term, an increase in the number of items or 
strategies. Thus, I consider the effect of the diversification of tax strategies on tax risk to be an empirical 
question.    
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Robinson, and Schmidt (2013) describe tax avoidance as a continuum ranging from 
perfectly legitimate, to more aggressive permanent book tax differences, to the most 
aggressive tax positions, such as tax sheltering.3 Thus, more tax avoidance could suggest 
a firm’s willingness to accept more risk. Building on agency theory and the assumption 
that managers are risk-averse, several studies suggest that this managerial aversion to risk 
drives variations in the level of tax avoidance (Chen and Chu (2005); Rego and Wilson 
(2012); Bardertscher, Katz, and Rego (2013); Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, and Shroff 
(2014)). 
 Consistent with this idea that there are risks associated with tax avoidance, the 
practitioner literature has focused on the importance of tax risk management (Arlinghaus 
(1998); Goodman (2004)). Along with other firm-specific risks, managers regularly 
discuss tax-related risks and plans to address these risks as part of their annual SEC 
filings. Tax risk is also increasingly discussed with revenue authorities worldwide, 
leading Big 4 accounting firms to publish surveys and guides for their clients on the 
importance of managing tax risk (PricewaterhouseCoopers (2004); Ernst & Young 
(2014)).  
 Despite the practitioner focus on reducing tax risk, it has been difficult for 
researchers to identify a relation between tax avoidance and risk. The literature finds that 
some firms are able to sustain tax avoidance in the long run (Dyreng, Hanlon, and 
Maydew (2008)) and that higher levels of tax avoidance do not necessarily result in 
higher risk (Guenther, Matsunaga, and Williams (2017) and Guenther, Wilson, and Wu 
                                                 
3 As Lisowsky et al. (2013) describe, tax sheltering is composed of tax positions that have little or no 
business purpose, but generate tax benefits that the tax authority will most likely disallow. Thus, these tax 
positions have the weakest facts and the highest amount of uncertainty. 
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(2018)). Wilde and Wilson (2018) summarize academic research on corporate tax 
planning and our limited understanding of how these two concepts of tax avoidance and 
tax risk are associated. 
One possible reason for this empirical result is the failure to consider the role that 
the diversification of tax risk, through utilization of a portfolio of different tax avoidance 
strategies, might have on reducing tax risk and, as a result, on reducing overall firm risk. 
Thus, I investigate the effect that the number of different tax strategies employed by a 
public company has on the relation between measures of corporate tax avoidance and 
measures of risk. 
 As described by Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2018), a precise definition of tax 
risk is not yet agreed upon in the tax literature, but the concepts of risk, uncertainty, and 
aggressiveness, with regard to tax, are related. Prior researchers have focused on the 
uncertainty of whether a firm will have to repay tax savings in the future (Dyreng, 
Hanlon, and Maydew (2018), Hanlon, Maydew, and Saavedra (2018), and Bauer and 
Klassen (2014)) and uncertainty regarding a firm’s future tax payments (Guenther, 
Matsunaga, and Williams (2016)). Neuman, Omer, and Schmidt (2018) draw on broad 
definitions of risk and define tax risk as “the uncertainty about future tax outcomes 
generated by current actions or activities, or the failure to take actions or pursue 
activities.” Drake, Lusch, and Stekelberg (2017) focus on a more classical finance 
definition and define tax risk as “the dispersion of potential outcomes from tax 
avoidance.”  
Drawing on this, for purposes of my study, I define tax risk as the likelihood that 
the tax outcome differs from what is expected. In other words, the actual amount of tax 
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ultimately avoided (after audits by the tax authorities, or the expiration of the statute of 
limitations) is different from what was planned. This results from the dispersion of 
potential outcomes or payoffs from a tax avoidance strategy due to, for example, 
uncertainty in the application of tax law, uncertainty over the facts of a situation, 
uncertainty over how well a firm’s accounting system arrives at the tax result, and 
uncertainty over whether a tax action will subject the firm to adverse attention. Consistent 
with this view, I measure tax risk as the dispersion, or variance, of tax outcomes from 
particular tax strategies, using the volatility of future cash effective tax rates (ETRs) over 
five years.4 As an indirect way to capture tax risk, I also use firm risk, defined as the 
standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the subsequent year.  
 While I am interested in the diversification of tax strategies, empirically I cannot 
observe which specific tax strategies managers employ in their tax planning. Thus, I 
create a measure of diversification that uses broad categories of book-tax differences 
(BTDs) as the sources of tax benefits. While each broad category may have tens or 
hundreds of underlying and unobservable individual tax positions, to the extent that a 
firm has more diverse broad categories of tax avoidance, it follows that the firm has more 
diverse underlying tax strategies. Despite measuring diversification at this relatively high 
level, I still find significant variation in the extent to which firms rely on a single 
category or source of tax avoidance versus multiple sources. Finally, if I could observe 
the underlying individual tax positions, it is likely that many would be highly correlated, 
and thus diversification may not have as great of an effect on tax risk. However, by using 
                                                 
4 In probability theory, variance is the expected value of the squared difference of a random variable (the 
actual outcome) from its mean (the expected outcome) and represents the dispersion or spread of the 
random variables about the mean. Thus, this mathematical definition of variance is what my definition of 
tax risk captures.   
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broader categories to measure diversification, it is less likely that each broad category is 
highly correlated.  
 To create these broad categories for my measure of diversification, I estimate the 
amount of tax avoided as thirty-five percent of total BTDs. This avoided tax is then 
separated into tax that is permanently avoided or tax that is temporarily avoided by 
deferring it to a future year. Each group is further separated into tax avoided on domestic 
or foreign source income. In addition, managers may also engage in state tax planning to 
source domestic income to states with little or no corporate income tax. To estimate a 
State BTD, I compare each firm’s state tax expense to the maximum corporate state tax 
rate of the state in which the firm is headquartered. Therefore, I divide total tax avoided 
into five sources, or “buckets,” of tax benefits: Permanent Foreign BTD, Permanent U.S. 
BTD, Temporary Foreign BTD, Temporary U.S. BTD, and State BTD. Thus, in any given 
year, a firm may avoid tax by utilizing up to five buckets. Over 5 years (3 years), the firm 
may avoid tax through 25 buckets (15 buckets). My measure of diversification, Diverse, 
is a continuous variable of the number of buckets utilized over the 5 years (3 years). In 
subsequent tests, I also use an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has high levels of 
diversification, and zero otherwise. 
In my main tests, I examine the relation between diversification and tax risk, 
measured as the standard deviation of annual cash ETRs over the next five years, as well 
as the effect of diversification on the relation between tax avoidance and tax risk. I 
regress tax risk on measures of tax avoidance (TaxAvoid), Diverse, and an interaction 
term between the two, along with control variables from Guenther et al. (2017). Using the 
continuous measures of Diverse, across my five-year and three-year measures, the 
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coefficient on Diverse is negative and statistically significant. This provides support for 
my hypothesis that holding the firm’s on-average expected tax savings constant, firms 
with high diversification have lower tax risk than firms with low diversification. Across 
all measures, the coefficient on the interaction term Diverse x TaxAvoid is negative, but it 
is only statistically significant when using two of my four TaxAvoid measures. Thus, 
overall I find mixed results in support of the second part of my hypothesis that high 
diversification mitigates the positive relation between tax avoidance and tax risk. My 
results using the indicator variable of Diverse are similar.   
To indirectly test my hypotheses, I repeat my main test, replacing tax risk with a 
measure of firm risk, as I assume that tax risk is included within this overall measure. I 
find weaker and statistically insignificant results using all measures. Together, I find 
mixed evidence on the effect of diversification on the relation between tax avoidance and 
overall firm risk. Overall, these results support findings from prior literature that there is 
no relation between tax avoidance and overall firm risk. Thus, while I do find weak 
support for the effect of diversification on tax risk, in general I do not find an effect on 
firm risk. In additional analysis, I find that tax spikes capture the concept of an 
unexpected tax outcome and proxy for tax risk. I continue to find weak support for my 
hypotheses using the incidence of tax spikes in the future 3 or 5 years as my measure of 
tax risk.  
Overall, my study contributes to the literature on the relation between tax 
avoidance and tax risk by introducing a new dimension, the concept of tax 
diversification. While prior researchers have failed to find a relation between tax 
avoidance and risk, I find a positive relation in my sample, using tax risk. I also find 
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weak, mixed support that diversification reduces tax risk and mitigates the effect of tax 
avoidance on tax risk. Therefore, I contribute to prior literature by proposing an 
explanation on why although avoiding tax is thought to be risky, empirically researchers 
have been unable to find a relation.    
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CHAPTER II 
DIVERSIFICATION 
Tax avoidance can broadly be defined as the reduction of a firm’s explicit tax 
liability (Hanlon and Heitzman (2010)). Firms may be able to achieve a certain level of 
tax avoidance with no additional cost or risk in their normal course of business by taking 
advantage of tax incentives embedded in the tax law. This level of tax avoidance depends 
on available opportunities, and varies by firm, depending on circumstances and industry. 
For example, firms engaged in research and development as part of their business 
strategy will benefit from R&D tax credits, while other firms will not. However, if a 
manager wants to increase the amount of the firm's tax avoidance beyond this basic level, 
she must engage in some sort of tax planning. There are non-trivial costs involved in tax 
planning, such as creating an internal tax department, paying for outside tax services, or 
legal and accounting costs to carry out a specific tax strategy. Thus, when a firm engages 
in tax planning, managers are making an investment in tax avoidance.  
The return on the investment is the expected or planned tax savings. However, 
there is some probability that the initial amount of the planned tax savings will not be 
achieved. Planned tax savings can be reduced in several ways. First, if audited, the firm 
may have to repay a portion of the savings, plus penalties and interest, if the tax authority 
successfully challenges the position during the audit. Second, before a tax strategy is 
completed, the tax law could change such that savings in future years are reduced or 
eliminated. Tax savings may never be realized due to failures within the tax strategy, 
such as a miscommunication between key business units. Finally, tax savings could be 
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offset by additional unforeseen costs such as reputational or political costs. The 
likelihood of any of these happening depends on the particular tax strategy.5  
FIN 48 (now codified in ASC 740-10) establishes a “more-likely-than-not” 
threshold for reporting uncertain tax positions in the financial statements, suggesting that 
firms engage in tax strategies knowing that the final amount of tax savings may not be the 
same as the initial amount of planned tax savings. While firms may engage in a tax 
strategy with an initial amount of planned tax savings in mind, after factoring in the 
probabilities of reduction, there is an on-average amount of expected tax savings. The 
dispersion, or variance, of the possible amounts of final tax savings, compared to this on-
average expected tax savings, represents tax risk for the purpose of my study.   
Each tax strategy has its own distribution of possible tax outcomes, with each 
outcome having a probability of occurring. If this distribution has a high variance, then 
the amount by which the firm could miss their expected return (the on-average expected 
tax savings) is large. This would represent higher tax risk because the firm could end up 
with tax savings much lower than expected. As an example, consider Firm A, which has 
one tax strategy. This strategy has two possible outcomes: the tax strategy is either 
successful or it fails. There is an eighty percent chance Firm A will end up with one 
hundred dollars of planned tax savings, and a twenty percent chance Firm A will end up 
with nothing. Thus, the on-average expected savings is eighty dollars. However, although 
on average Firm A expects to end up with eighty dollars of tax savings, if the tax strategy 
                                                 
5 To the extent the tax avoidance strategy results in a financial reporting problem (such as a restatement), or 
fails to provide a financial reporting benefit in the form of a lower tax expense, this could also reduce the 
expected benefit from the tax strategy.  
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fails, Firm A ends up with the much lower amount of zero tax savings. The variance of 
the possible two tax outcomes represents my measure of tax risk.   
Drawing again on portfolio theory, diversifying a portfolio will reduce the overall 
variance of a portfolio's payoffs, provided that the payoffs of each individual asset are not 
perfectly correlated. To continue the example, consider a second firm, Firm B, which 
plans to avoid the same one hundred dollars of tax as Firm A. However, Firm B has two 
tax strategies that are perfectly correlated, planning to save fifty dollars each. These two 
strategies have the same possible outcomes as Firm A’s strategy: either both strategies 
succeed, or both strategies fail. For each strategy, there is an eighty percent chance Firm 
B will end up fifty dollars, and a twenty percent chance Firm B will end up with nothing. 
Thus, adding the two together, the on-average expected tax savings of the two strategies 
is eighty dollars, the same as Firm A. If these two strategies are perfectly correlated, the 
variance of the possible outcomes for Firm B is the same as Firm A. If both strategies 
fail, Firm B gets nothing. If both strategies succeed, Firm B gets one hundred dollars of 
savings. Thus, Firm A and Firm B have the same tax risk. 
However, if the outcomes of the two strategies are not perfectly correlated, then 
there is a third possible outcome. Both strategies succeed, both strategies fail, or one 
strategy succeeds and one fails. The possible outcomes are now one hundred, fifty, or 
zero dollars.6 Thus, even though both Firm A and Firm B expect eighty dollars of tax 
savings on average, if Firm B misses that amount, they could still end up with fifty 
dollars of tax savings. The less correlated the two strategies are, the more likely the fifty 
                                                 
6 The probability of both strategies having a zero payoff is 0.2 x 0.2 = 0.04. The probability of both 
strategies having a $50 payoff is 0.8 x 0.8 = 0.64. The probability of one strategy having a zero payoff and 
the other having a $50 payoff is 2 x 0.8 x 0.2 = 0.32. ($0 x 0.04) + ($100 x 0.64) + ($50 x 0.32) = $80, the 
expected payoff. 
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dollar outcome. Thus, having two strategies that are not perfectly correlated reduces the 
variance of the overall tax planning of Firm B and reduces the amount by which Firm B 
could miss their expected tax savings. Firm B has lower tax risk.7  
In sum, holding the on-average expected tax savings constant, increasing the 
number of strategies shrinks the variance of the tax planning portfolio, making the 
distribution of outcomes closer to the expected tax savings amount. Therefore, tax risk is 
reduced to the extent the distribution of possible outcomes gets closer to the expected tax 
savings. 
As a more general analogy, tax avoidance can be thought of as creating a 
contingent liability, where a potential tax expense (the tax liability) may occur depending 
on the outcome of uncertain future events (e.g., the firm’s success in carrying out tax 
avoidance, the potential for IRS audits, or the potential for negative public attention, to 
name a few). While the potential tax expense can be reasonably estimated, the final 
amount and thus the final amount of tax avoidance depend on these uncertain, future 
events.  
One common type of contingent liability is a lawsuit. For example, assume a firm 
is sued for damages of $100, and the manager believes there is a 25 percent chance the 
firm will lose the lawsuit. Thus, the expected future cash outflow is $25, but the only two 
possible actual outcomes are $100 (a 25 percent chance of losing the lawsuit) or $0 (a 75 
percent chance of winning the lawsuit). A second type of contingent liability is warranty 
expense. Assume a firm sells ten units. There is a 25 percent chance that each unit will 
need to be repaired under warranty, costing the firm $10 per unit repaired. Thus, with this 
                                                 
7 The variance of the single strategy for Firm A is 1,600, while the variance of the two strategies for Firm B 
(assuming the outcomes are uncorrelated) is 800. 
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type of contingent liability, the expected future cash outflow is still $25, but now there 
are eleven possible actual outcomes, ranging from a cash outflow of $100 (all ten units 
are repaired), to $90 (nine units are repaired), and so on to $0 (none of the units are 
repaired). Despite the same $25 expected future cash outflow from both contingent 
liabilities, the larger number of possible actual outcomes leads to a smaller variance for 
the warranty, as compared to the lawsuit.  
Thus, relating back to tax avoidance, with just a single tax avoidance strategy that 
either succeeds or fails, the variance of the future cash outflows (taxes) behaves like that 
of the lawsuit. However, the more tax avoidance strategies the firm employs, or the more 
the firm diversifies their tax planning, the more the variance of the future cash outflows 
behaves like that of the warranty. Increasing the number of potential outcomes can reduce 
the variance, and thus reduce tax risk.                        
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CHAPTER III 
HYPOTHESES 
 The concept of diversification can be summarized in the popular idiom “don’t put 
all your eggs in one basket.” Markowitz (1952, 1959) introduces diversification in 
portfolio theory, where an investor constructs their portfolio of investments to minimize 
their risk for a given level of expected return, thus creating an efficient portfolio. Risk 
depends not only on the variance of each individual asset in the portfolio, but also on the 
correlation, or covariance, between every two individual assets. Thus, diversifying a 
portfolio by including assets with unrelated risk will reduce the overall risk of the 
portfolio. Applying this to a corporate tax avoidance setting, engaging in tax planning 
represents an investment in tax avoidance. The overall goal of reducing the amount of 
income tax owed is carried out through specific tax strategies. While each strategy has an 
initial amount of planned tax savings, the final outcome may be different than planned. 
Based on the probability of each outcome, each tax strategy has an on-average expected 
amount of tax savings and a distribution of possible outcomes. The dispersion, or 
variance, of these outcomes represents tax risk. If a firm diversifies their tax planning 
portfolio with multiple tax strategies whose outcomes are not perfectly correlated, then 
the variance of their overall outcomes is reduced.  
Thus, regardless of the riskiness of the level of tax avoidance, the diversification 
of tax strategies can reduce risk through the reduced variance of outcomes. Whether a 
diversified firm has a Cash ETR of 20 percent or 30 percent, the tax outcome is less 
volatile, as compared to a non-diversified firm. In addition, for a given level of tax 
avoidance, the diversification of tax strategies can reduce the effect of tax avoidance on 
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tax risk. Comparing two firms that avoid more tax with a Cash ETR of 20 percent, the 
more diverse firm is less risky. Therefore, I hypothesize that:    
H1(a): Ceteris paribus, for a given level of tax avoidance, the diversification of 
tax strategies reduces tax risk. 
H1(b): Ceteris paribus, for a given level of tax avoidance, the diversification of 
tax strategies mitigates the effect of tax avoidance on tax risk. 
However, there are several potential reasons why diversification could increase 
the variance of possible outcomes, and thus increase tax risk. First, adding certain tax 
strategies could affect the likelihood of a tax strategy failing. For example, if a firm has 
subsidiaries in multiple countries including one tax haven, audit risk and reputational risk 
might increase if the firm diversified by adding subsidiaries in two additional tax havens. 
In such a case, the more diversified a firm’s tax strategies are, the more exposure there is 
for a regulatory authority or the public to take notice. This could increase the likelihood 
that both strategies fail, increasing the variance of the possible outcomes, and increasing 
tax risk.  
 Second, more strategies could increase the complexity of the firm’s operations, 
which could lead to a greater risk of accounting errors, affecting the probability of the tax 
savings failing to materialize as expected. This in turn would affect tax risk due to the 
increased variance of the outcomes. Thus, diversification could add new potential 
outcomes that would not be present without increased diversification.  
 Third, increasing the number of tax strategies and the complexity of the tax 
function could provide managers with more opportunities to divert earnings, increasing 
the risk of managerial theft (Desai and Dharmapala (2006)). This could cause the firm to 
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miss the on-average expected tax savings, increasing tax risk. Finally, diversification of 
tax strategies may fail to reduce tax risk if the potential outcomes of the tax strategies are 
highly correlated. In this case, the firm would be adding additional strategies to their tax 
planning portfolio without any benefits of diversification. In sum, the predicted effect of 
diversification is unclear. Thus, in testing my two hypotheses, I view the effect of the 
diversification of tax strategies on tax risk as an empirical question. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESULTS 
Sample Selection and Variable Definitions 
 Table 1 summarizes my sample selection procedure. I begin by closely following 
the sample selection procedures from Guenther et al. (2017), extended to more recent 
years. I refer to this sample as the GMW Replication sample. I begin with all U.S. 
incorporated observations in Compustat from 1987 to 2017 with available data. For the 5-
Year (3-Year) sample, each firm is required to have data for five (three) consecutive 
years to calculate the TaxAvoid measure, as well as a sixth (fourth) consecutive year to 
calculate the monthly stock return volatility over the subsequent year. In addition, I 
require sufficient data to calculate all control variables. One deviation from the Guenther 
et al. (2017) sample selection process is that I also require the TaxAvoid measure to be 
calculated entirely post-FAS 109, as this is a requirement for my measure of 
diversification.8 Thus, because I require five (three) years of data post-FAS 109 and one 
year of future data, my GMW replication sample period effectively runs from 1997 – 
2016 (1995 – 2016) for the 5-Year (3-Year sample), while the Guenther et al. (2017) 
sample period effectively runs from 1992 – 2010 for their stock return volatility tests.  
 I further limit my sample, the Diversification sample, and eliminate all 
observations with insufficient data to calculate my measure of diversification. I exclude 
all observations with negative pretax income, as well as observations missing current and 
                                                 
8 Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 109 (FAS 109), codified as ASC 740, is effective for 
fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1992. FAS 109 established basic principles of accounting for 
income taxes, including deferred tax liabilities and assets. Because my measure of diversification is 
calculated using “buckets” of current and deferred income taxes, I require t-4 (t-2) for the 5-Year (3-Year) 
sample to be no earlier than 1993.  
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deferred taxes and pretax domestic and foreign income. In addition, I require firms to 
overall avoid tax over the 5-Year (3-Year) period. My Firm Risk sample for tests using 
stock return volatility consists of 11,859 (16,587) observations for the 5-Year (3-Year) 
sample. Finally, tests using future cash ETR volatility require five future years of data, 
limiting my Tax Risk sample to 7,123 (9,951) observations for the 5-Year (3-Year) 
sample.       
I create two measures of TaxAvoid, focusing on the level of tax avoidance 
managers expect when engaging in tax planning. Although managers enter into a tax 
strategy with an initial amount of planned tax savings in mind, after factoring in the 
probabilities of reduction, there are multiple potential outcomes. Thus, there is an on-
average amount of expected tax savings. I first measure this expected tax avoidance as 
the average cash ETR (defined as cash taxes paid over pretax income less special items) 
over five (three) years. I winsorize the tax rates to fall between zero and one to aid in 
interpretation. Finally, I multiply the tax rates by negative one, so that 5-Year TaxAvoid 
((3-Year TaxAvoid) are increasing in tax avoidance.  
My second measure is 5-Year Adjusted TaxAvoid (3-Year Adjusted TaxAvoid), 
calculated as the firm’s five year (three year) cash ETR subtracted from the average 
(median) cash ETR for the firm’s size/industry portfolio over the same five year (three 
year) period. This variable is increasing in tax avoidance. Rational expectations theory 
suggests that although managers may miss the on-average amount of expected tax 
savings some of the time, on average they will be correct.9 By incorporating previous tax 
                                                 
9 Rational expectations theory is an economic theory proposed by John Muth in his 1961 paper “ Rational 
Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements,” published in Econometrica. The theory suggests that 
economic outcomes will generally be what people predict. While they may be in error sometimes, errors 
are infrequent and random, and thus on average people are correct.   
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savings, on average this amount represents what managers estimated the expected tax 
savings to be. Thus, using these two five-year (three-year) average measures of tax 
avoidance should represent the on-average amount of expected tax savings. 
Because I define tax risk as the dispersion, or variance, of tax outcomes from 
particular tax strategies, I focus on measures of risk in the literature that reflect volatility. 
Guenther et al. (2017) find that the volatility of cash ETRs is associated with future stock 
volatility, suggesting a relation to firm risk. Based on this, subsequent researchers have 
measured tax risk as the five-year standard deviation of annual cash ETRs (Hutchens and 
Rego (2015); Drake, Lusch, and Stekelberg (2017); Abernathy, Rapley, and Stekelberg 
(2017); Campbell, Cecchini, Cianci, Ehinger, and Werner (2017)). This measure captures 
fluctuations in the cash ETR due to temporary, nonrecurring strategies, as well as a tax 
strategy failure. It captures any reversal upon audit by tax authorities, and in addition, 
within each cash ETR it will capture the failure of a tax strategy to avoid as much tax as 
expected (resulting in a higher cash ETR). Thus, I use the five-year standard deviation of 
annual cash ETRs as my first measure of risk, TaxRisk.  
 One limitation of this measure is that although it is a more direct measure of tax 
outcomes, it does not capture any unforeseen costs of a tax strategy, such as reputational 
costs, as these costs would not be included in a cash ETR. I assume that the variance of 
tax outcomes, my definition of tax risk, will be indirectly reflected in the overall volatility 
of the firm. Thus, for my second measure of tax risk I want to capture overall firm risk. 
To do this I measure FirmRisk as stock return volatility, calculated as the standard 
deviation of monthly stock returns over the subsequent year.    
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Descriptive Statistics 
 Panels A and B of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the larger GMW 
Replication sample and my smaller Diversification sample, respectively. The mean 
(median) 5-Year TaxAvoid of -22.16 percent (-24.29 percent) in the Diversification 
sample is less negative than the mean (median) of -27.03 percent (-26.09 percent) in the 
GMW replication sample. Thus, firms in the Diversification sample avoid more tax, 
consistent with my sample selection requirement that firms in this sample are overall tax 
avoiders. Firms in the Diversification sample also avoid more tax compared to peers in 
their industry/size portfolio, with the mean of 5-Year Adjusted TaxAvoid at 0.74 percent 
compared to -2.05 percent in the GMW Replication sample. In addition, firms in the 
Diversification sample are larger and less volatile in terms of TaxRisk and FirmRisk. 
Finally, 14.09 percent of firms in the GMW Replication sample have losses in the current 
year, while the Diversification sample excludes all firms with losses.    
Panel C of Table 2 presents the industry composition of both samples using the 
Fama-French 49 industry codes. The largest industries in both samples include Retail, 
Business Services, Electronic Services, and Computer Software. In general, the industry 
composition of the two samples is similar, with a few exceptions. The GMW Replication 
sample has a larger percentage of firms in Utilities (4.27%) and Banking (7.31%), as 
compared to the Diversification sample (1.27% and 1.52%, respectively). Lastly, the 
Trading industry comprises 11.40% of the Diversification sample, compared to 7.12% of 
the GMW Replication sample.    
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Test of Findings from Prior Literature 
Since prior literature fails to find a relation between tax avoidance and firm risk, I 
first replicate this finding using the GMW Replication sample and estimate the following 
regression model using control variables from Guenther et al. (2017):   
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑉𝑉_𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽5𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹_𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽8𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑉𝑉_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽9𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑉𝑉_𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹ℎ𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽10𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑉𝑉_𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽11𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽12𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽13𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽14𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                                                                                               (1) 
where FirmRisk, as discussed above, is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns 
over the subsequent year. I use two measures of tax avoidance, 5-Year TaxAvoid and 3-
Year Adjusted TaxAvoid to follow prior literature. All other control variables are defined 
in Appendix A. Table 3, columns 1 and 2, present the results. Consistent with prior 
literature, I fail to find a significant relation between tax avoidance and firm risk, for both 
the 5-Year and Adjusted 3-Year measures, and in fact, the coefficients on both measures 
suggest tax avoidance is not risky, though not statistically significant at conventional 
levels.  
 I next estimate Equation (1) with both measures of TaxAvoid using my smaller 
Diversification sample. Table 3, columns 3 and 4, present the results. Consistent with 
prior literature, I again fail to find a significant relation between tax avoidance and risk. 
However, I do find a positive, though statistically insignificant, coefficient on TaxAvoid, 
suggesting that for this sample, as tax avoidance increases, firm risk may increase as 
well. I also replace FirmRisk with TaxRisk, and estimate Equation (1). Table 3, columns 5 
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and 6, present the results. For the Diversification sample, as tax avoidance increases, tax 
risk increases as well, though not statistically significant at conventional levels.  
Overall, these results differ from prior literature, suggesting that for my 
Diversification sample, tax avoidance may be risky. I attribute this difference to my more 
restrictive sample limitations resulting in a different sample composition. I estimate (not 
tabulated) Equation (1) using the 30,664 (30,508) observations included in the GMW 
Replication sample, but excluded from my Diversification sample, using 5-Year 
TaxAvoid (3-Year Adjusted TaxAvoid) and continue to find a negative, though not 
statistically significant, coefficient on TaxAvoid. This suggests that my smaller 
Diversification sample behaves differently from the majority of the GMW Replication 
sample, and suggests that the prior finding of an insignificant relation between tax 
avoidance and firm risk from prior literature may not hold for all sets of firms. This is 
consistent with Hutchens, Rego, and Williams (2019), who examine the relation between 
tax avoidance and firm risk using latent class mixture models and find that this relation 
varies across different groups of firms.   
Diversification Measurement and Descriptive Statistics 
 While the focus of this paper is on the diversification of tax strategies, empirically 
I cannot observe which tax strategies managers employ in their tax planning. What I can 
observe, however, is the outcome of these tax strategies in the form of how much tax a 
firm has avoided, compared to the U.S. statutory rate of thirty-five percent. In addition, I 
can observe that these benefits of tax avoidance seem to come from different sources. As 
an example, these sources could include permanently avoided tax from municipal bond 
interest or temporarily deferred tax from accelerated depreciation. Although there can be 
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any number of tax strategies aggregating into one source of a tax benefit, to the extent 
that a firm has more diverse sources of tax benefits, it follows that the firm has more 
diverse underlying tax strategies. Thus, my measure of diversification reflects the 
diversification of the sources of benefits of tax avoidance, which in turn reflect the 
diversification of the underlying tax strategies. 
  My measure of diversification uses broad categories of book-tax differences 
(BTDs) as the sources of tax benefits. These include permanent U.S., permanent foreign, 
temporary U.S., and temporary foreign BTDs, as well as an estimated State BTD. By 
comparing the expected current year tax, measured as pretax income multiplied by thirty-
five percent, to the firm’s actual current year tax, I estimate the amount of tax avoided. 
This avoided tax can then be separated into tax that is permanently avoided or tax that is 
temporarily avoided by deferring it to a future year. Each group can further be separated 
into tax avoided on domestic or foreign source income.  
The U.S statutory corporate tax rate is thirty-five percent, imposed on worldwide 
income, over the available sample period.10 Thus, if firms do not avoid any tax, their 
expected current year U.S. tax on worldwide income should be: 
𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 × 35%         
where: 
PI = pretax income, and observations with negative pretax income are excluded.  
However, the firm’s actual current year tax is: 
𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂                                                                                      
                                                 
10 From 1993 to 2017, U.S. corporations were taxed using income tax brackets, with a maximum rate of 35 
percent. The TCJA of 2017 eliminated the income tax brackets and imposed a flat corporate tax rate of 21 
percent beginning in 2018. In addition, the TCJA of 2017 moves the U.S. from a worldwide tax system to a 
territorial tax system. 
 
 
23 
 
where: 
 TXFED = current U.S. tax expense 
 TXFO = current foreign tax expense 
Comparing the two results in the amount of tax avoided: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇                                                            
Part of the tax avoided is deferred, or temporarily avoided. It is avoided in the current 
year, but is expected to be incurred in future years. 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂                                                   
where: 
TXDFED = deferred U.S. tax expense 
TXDFO = deferred foreign tax expense 
If the tax is not temporarily avoided, it is permanently avoided.  
𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 − 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇          
During the available sample period, prior to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, 
the income from foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) is 
subject to U.S. corporate income tax.11 However, active source income is not taxed until 
the income is repatriated, or paid as a dividend, back to the parent entity. Upon 
repatriation, the firm generally pays the difference between the U.S. and foreign tax 
rate.12 For financial reporting purposes, if the operating earnings reinvested abroad in the 
                                                 
11 The TCJA of 2017 moves the U.S. from a worldwide tax system to a territorial tax system, thereby 
eliminating most U.S. tax on active source foreign income beginning in 2018. However, it is not a pure 
territorial tax system, as the TCJA does include anti-base erosion measures such as a tax on Global 
Intangible Low-Taxed Income (GILTI) and a Base Erosion and Anti-Abuse Tax (BEAT).   
12 The amount of the dividend is grossed up by the foreign tax rate and that total amount is taxed at the U.S. 
statutory rate of thirty-five percent. The firm then receives a foreign tax credit for foreign taxes paid, which 
helps mitigate any impact from double taxation. Thus, the incremental tax owed upon repatriation can 
generally be thought of as the difference between thirty-five percent and the foreign tax rate.  
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foreign subsidiaries are designated as “indefinitely reinvested,” the firm does not record a 
tax expense or deferred tax liability for the U.S. tax owed upon repatriation. Thus, the tax 
on indefinitely reinvested foreign earnings is generally considered to be permanently 
avoided.13 Firms disclose the cumulative amount of IRFE in their annual filings. 
Comparing the prior year cumulative total to the current year cumulative total provides 
an estimation of the current year foreign earnings designated as indefinitely reinvested, 
Estimated IRFE.14 I estimate the permanent foreign BTD as: 
𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂 𝐹𝐹𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = �35% − �𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 +𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
�� × 𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸           
where: 
 PIFO = pretax foreign income 
I assume Permanent Foreign BTD is zero for observations with zero or negative pretax 
foreign income.  
The permanently avoided tax is composed of foreign and U.S. BTDs. Thus: 
𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂 𝑈𝑈. 𝑆𝑆.𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂 𝐹𝐹𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇      
I assume that the incremental tax on current year foreign earnings not designated as 
indefinitely reinvested are deferred, as the tax is not current until the year in which the 
repatriation occurs. Thus, I estimate the temporary foreign BTD as: 
                                                 
13 Firms report “indefinitely reinvested foreign earnings” (IRFE) as a permanent difference in the tax rate 
reconciliation in the income tax footnote. Because of this, IRFE are often referred to in the literature as 
“permanently reinvested earnings” (PRE).  
14 This information is available in the database Audit Analytics beginning in 2008. To estimate IRFE for 
firm-years missing this data, I multiply pretax foreign income by an average percent. The average percent 
is calculated as the median percent of pretax foreign earnings designated as IRFE each year pretax foreign 
income is greater than zero. IRFE is winsorized to range from zero to that year’s total pretax foreign 
income.     
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𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 𝐹𝐹𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
= �35% − �𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂
�� × ( 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂 − 𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸 )        
I assume Temporary Foreign BTD is zero for observations with zero or negative pretax 
foreign income. 
The temporarily avoided tax is composed of foreign and U.S. BTDs. Thus: 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 𝑈𝑈. 𝑆𝑆.𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 𝐹𝐹𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇        
Finally, managers may also engage in state tax planning to source U.S. income to 
states with little or no corporate income tax. Although total state income taxes can also be 
separated into current and deferred taxes, most taxable income for state purposes 
conforms very closely to federal taxable income. Thus, a temporary BTD due to a timing 
difference would be reflected in both federal and state deferred taxes. In other words, the 
same temporary tax strategies used for federal tax avoidance will often manifest in state 
tax avoidance. Therefore, to avoid double counting tax strategies I focus on location as 
the dominant state tax strategy. To estimate the State BTD, I compare each firm’s total 
state tax expense (current and deferred) to the maximum corporate state tax rate of the 
state in which the firm is headquartered: 
𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = (𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝑂𝑂𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝐵𝐵) − 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 − 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆                                  
where: 
 PIDOM = pretax domestic income 
 TXS = current state tax expense 
 TXDS = deferred state tax expense 
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Therefore, each year the total tax avoided arises from five sources of tax benefits, or 
“buckets”: Permanent Foreign BTD, Permanent U.S. BTD, Temporary Foreign BTD, 
Temporary U.S. BTD, and State BTD.  
Each positive “bucket” counts as one source of tax benefit, where each non-
positive “bucket” counts as zero, for a potential sum of five per year. Using a five-year 
(three-year) measure, each firm has an opportunity to utilize 25 (15) buckets over that 
five-year (three-year) time period. Diverse_Count25 (Diverse_Count15) represent the 
total number of buckets each firm utilized. Since the firms in my Diversification sample 
avoid tax overall, Diverse_Count25 (Diverse_Count15) can range from 1 to 25 (15). 
Table 4 presents the distribution of Diverse_Count25 and Diverse_Count15. The average 
firm avoided tax using 13.18 of 25 buckets over five years and 7.89 of 15 buckets over 
three years. In general, both measures have similar distributions with approximately one 
third of the sample avoiding tax using at least an average of three buckets per year, or 15 
(9) buckets over five (three) years. My measure of diversification, Diverse, is the 
continuous variable Diverse_Count25 or Diverse_Count15 for tests using the five and 
three year measures, respectively.    
Despite evidence from Dyreng et al. (2008) that some firms are able to sustain 
low ETRs for a long period of time, some firms are not able to sustain low ETRs and 
experience spikes in their tax rate, suggesting a prior tax position may have been 
overturned. I adapt my measure from Saavedra (2018) and define Tax Spike 3-Year (Tax 
Spike 5-Year) as an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm has a cash tax payment equal to 
at least 60 percent of pre-tax book income (less special items) in any of the future three 
(five years), and zero otherwise. I graph the percentage of firms at each level of 
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diversification, using Diverse_Count25 and Diverse_Count15, with a tax spike in the 
future three or five years. Figures 1 and 2 present the graphs for Tax Spike 3-Year and 
Tax Spike 5-Year for each level of diversification over five years (Diverse_Count25). 
Figures 3 and 4 present the graphs for Tax Spike 3-Year and Tax Spike 5-Year for each 
level of diversification over three years (Diverse_Count15). All four figures show that as 
diversification increases, the percentage of firms experiencing a tax spike in future years 
decreases, providing descriptive evidence that diversification may reduce tax risk (the 
likelihood of a tax outcome different from what was expected).   
Main Regression 
In H1(a), I hypothesize that holding tax avoidance constant, diversification 
reduces tax risk, and in H1(b), I hypothesize that diversification also mitigates the effect 
of tax avoidance on tax risk. To test H1(a) and H1(b), I estimate the following regression 
on my Diversification sample. I regress tax risk on tax avoidance, diversification, and the 
interaction term between the two, along with the control variables from Equation (1). I 
omit the Loss control variable from Equation (1) as firms in my Diversification sample 
are required to have positive pretax income each year.  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + 𝛽𝛽3𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑉𝑉_𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽8𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹_𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽9𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑉𝑉_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽10𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑉𝑉_𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹ℎ𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽11𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑉𝑉_𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽12𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽13𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽14𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                                                                                                  (2) 
TaxRisk represents the standard deviation of future cash ETR over five years. TaxAvoid is 
one of the four measures of tax avoidance, 5-Year TaxAvoid and 5-Year Adjusted 
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TaxAvoid, as well as the 3-Year measures. Diverse, as described above, is either of the 
continuous variables Diverse_Count25 and Diverse_Count15. All other variables are 
described in Appendix A.  
Table 5, Panel A presents the results using the continuous Diverse measures. 
Across three of the four 5-Year and 3-Year measures of tax avoidance, the coefficient on 
Diverse is negative and statistically significant. This provides support for H1(a) that 
holding the firm’s on-average expected tax savings constant (controlling for the tax 
avoidance in 𝛽𝛽1), firms with high diversification have lower tax risk than firms with low 
diversification. Across three of the four 5-Year and 3-Year measures of tax avoidance, 
the coefficient on TaxAvoid is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that as tax 
avoidance increases, tax risk increases. The interaction term Diverse x TaxAvoid can be 
interpreted as how when a firm moves from low tax avoidance to high tax avoidance, 
diversification has more of a negative impact on tax risk. Across all measures, the 
coefficient is negative, but it is only statistically significant when using the 5-Year 
TaxAvoid and 3-Year TaxAvoid measures. This provides weak support for H1(b) that 
diversification reduces the positive relation between tax avoidance and tax risk. 
Next, to aid in the interpretation of my results, I use predictive margins to 
examine the relation between tax risk and diversification at various levels of tax 
avoidance. I estimate and plot the slopes (not tabulated) of TaxRisk on Diverse, holding 
TaxAvoid constant at eleven different levels of low to high tax avoidance. The 
intersection point of these eleven lines of best fit provides a cut-off between low and high 
levels of diversification. Overall, across all four measures of TaxAvoid, when tax 
avoidance is low, higher diversification is predicted to yield more tax risk than lower 
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diversification. When tax avoidance is high, higher diversification is predicted to yield 
less tax risk than lower diversification. Said differently, when diversification is low, 
lower tax avoidance is predicted to yield less tax risk than higher tax avoidance. When 
diversification is high, lower tax avoidance is predicted to yield more tax risk than higher 
tax avoidance.       
As a second measure of Diverse, I partition Diverse_Count25 and 
Diverse_Count15 into high and low diversification using the cut-off point provided by 
this predictive margins analysis. For the five-year (three-year) measures, firms are highly 
diversified if they utilize at least 19 (9) buckets over five (three) years. Thus, my second 
measure of diversification, Diverse, is an indicator variable equal to one if 
Diverse_Count25 (Diverse_Count15) is 19 (9) or higher, and zero otherwise. Table 5, 
Panel B presents the results using the indicator variable Diverse measures. Across all 5-
Year and 3-Year measures tax avoidance, the coefficient on Diverse is negative and the 
coefficient on TaxAvoid is positive, though much weaker than the results in Panel A 
using the continuous measures. The interaction term Diverse x TaxAvoid can be 
interpreted as how having more tax strategies (diversification) reduces the relation 
between tax avoidance and tax risk. Across all measures, the coefficient is negative, but it 
is not statistically significant at conventional measures. Overall, Panel B continues to 
provide weak support for H1(a) and H1(b).15  
Given that I find in the predictive margins analysis that the effect of 
diversification on the relation between tax avoidance and risk depends on the level of tax 
                                                 
15 I repeat this analysis using alternative cut-offs for high versus low diversification, including a consistent 
cut-off of having avoided tax using at least an average of three of five buckets per year, or 15 (9) buckets 
over five (three) years. The results are overall similar, providing weak support for my hypotheses.   
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avoidance, I formally test whether the results I find in Table 5 are dependent on the level 
of tax avoidance. I partition my sample into thirds based on the 5-Year TaxAvoid measure 
and estimate Equation (2) for each of the three groups, representing low, medium, and 
high levels of tax avoidance. Table 6 presents the results. The coefficient on Diverse is 
negative and statistically significant at the one percent level for the portion of the sample 
with high levels of tax avoidance. Overall, the effect I find in Table 5 seems to be 
concentrated among those firms with higher levels of tax avoidance, using the 5-Year 
TaxAvoid measure.16 This provides additional support for my hypotheses, and supports 
the idea that if a firm is not engaging in much tax avoidance, then diversification does not 
have an effect.   
I next focus on my second measure of risk, and estimate Equation (2) using 
FirmRisk instead of TaxRisk, measuring risk as the standard deviation of future monthly 
stock returns over the subsequent year. Table 7, Panel A presents the results using the 
continuous Diverse measures. While the results using the 5-Year and 3-Year adjusted 
TaxAvoid measures support my hypothesis that diversification reduces firm risk, overall 
the results are inconsistent. Table 7, Panel B presents the results using the indicator 
variable Diverse measures. I find similar results as Panel A, with weak support for H1(a) 
using the adjusted TaxAvoid measures, but overall inconsistency. Together, both panels 
of Table 7 provide mixed evidence on the effect of diversification on firm risk as well as 
on the relation between tax avoidance and overall firm risk. In Table 3, I replicate 
findings from prior literature that there is no relation between tax avoidance and overall 
                                                 
16 The results in Table 6 are also similar when I use the 5-Year Adjusted TaxAvoid measure. Results using 
the three-year measures are mixed.  
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firm risk, which is supported by Table 7 as well. Thus, while I do find weak support for 
the effect of diversification on tax risk, in general I do not find an effect on firm risk. 
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CHAPTER V 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
Measures of Tax Risk 
 While the volatility of cash ETRs has been widely used in the literature as a proxy 
for tax risk, other measures may also capture the concept of unexpected tax outcomes. 
One such measure is tax spikes, as a spike in the cash ETR suggests that prior tax 
positions may have been overturned. In Figures 1-4 I found descriptive evidence that as 
diversification increases, the percentage of firms experiencing a tax spike in futures years 
(3 or 5) decreases. I formalize this test and estimate Equation (2) using Tax-Spike 3-Year 
and Tax-Spike 5-Year as my measures of tax risk. TaxAvoid is one of the four measures 
of tax avoidance, 5-Year TaxAvoid and 5-Year Adjusted TaxAvoid, as well as the 3-Year 
measures. Diverse is the continuous variables Diverse_Count25 and Diverse_Count15.  
Table 8, Panel A presents the results using Tax-Spike 3-Year and Panel B presents 
the results using Tax-Spike 5-Year. Though weaker than my main results using the future 
volatility of cash ETRs as the measure of tax risk, the results in both panels generally 
follow the findings of Table 5, Panel A. I generally find that tax avoidance increases tax 
risk and diversification reduces tax risk. The coefficient on the interaction term continues 
to be negative, suggesting that as a firm moves from low to high levels of tax avoidance, 
diversification has more of a negative impact on tax risk. Overall, these results weakly 
support my hypotheses and suggest that tax spikes are an indicator of tax risk.  
A second measure that may capture unexpected tax outcomes is the future 
volatility of GAAP ETRs. The GAAP ETR is affected by the valuation allowance, which 
is a reserve to offset deferred tax assets for any portion of a tax benefit that more likely 
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than not will not be realized. The GAAP ETR incorporates what managers expect the tax 
outcome to be. For a tax outcome to be unexpected and affect GAAP ETR volatility, it 
likely affects the GAAP ETR for more than what was reserved for (what was expected). 
Therefore, the GAAP ETR may represent a better way to measure truly unexpected tax 
outcomes. Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, and Shroff (2014) find that 84 percent of publicly 
traded firms value GAAP ETR at least as much as cash taxes paid, and anecdotal 
evidence suggests that many managers only care about taxes in so much as with regard to 
how taxes affect earnings. Thus, I propose the volatility of GAAP ETRs as a second 
measure of unexpected tax outcomes, capturing tax risk.  
Table 9 presents the results. Across all four measures of TaxAvoid, the coefficient 
on Diverse is negative, but statistically insignificant. However, I find conflicting results 
on my other variables of interest TaxAvoid and the interaction term between the 5-Year 
and 3-Year measures. Overall, the results from Table 9 are not significant and provide no 
support for my hypotheses. Thus, the future volatility of GAAP ETRs may not be an 
appropriate proxy for tax risk.         
Measure of Diversification 
 One potential issue with my measure of diversification is that I must impose many 
restrictions on my sample selection process, eliminating approximately 75 percent of the 
observations used with my GMW Replication sample. To help mitigate this potential 
issue, I devise a second, alternative measure of diversification based on the number of 
line items in the ETR reconciliation in the tax footnote that reduce the firm’s GAAP 
ETR. I propose that as the number of reducing line items increases, the more the firm has 
diversified their tax avoidance strategies. To create this measure, I extract the data tables 
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for the ETR reconciliation for all available firm-years from directEDGAR, using the 
ExtractionPreprocessed function. This function has already extracted the ETR 
reconciliation from the Forms 10-K and has preprocessed all the data into a readable 
spreadsheet format. Although electronic Forms 10-K are available from fiscal year 1993 
to 2017, the directEDGAR team has not included all years or firms in the 
ExtractionPreprocessed function, and the collection is strongest from 2005 forward. 
Thus, one limitation of this measure is that the universe of firms represented in this 
sample may not be representative of all firms and the sample selection process may be 
biased by ease of data extraction. 
 Using the extracted data, I count the number of negative line items (line items that 
reduce the tax rate) in the ETR reconciliation for each firm-year, excluding the first and 
last observations, which represent that starting point (the statutory rate applied to pretax 
income) and the ending point (the firm’s GAAP tax expense) and not reconciling items. 
To help mitigate concerns that this measure captures the firm’s disclosure policies rather 
than the diversification of tax strategies, I only count negative line items that reduce the 
tax rate by at least five percent. I sum each negative count over five and three years to 
represent how many strategies were used over a five and three year period, respectively. 
This variable, Negative_Count5 (Negative_Count3) is a continuous measure increasing in 
diversification.  
 I estimate Equation (2) where TaxRisk represents the standard deviation of future 
cash ETR over five years and TaxAvoid is one of the four measures of tax avoidance, 5-
Year TaxAvoid and 5-Year Adjusted TaxAvoid, as well as the 3-Year measures. Diverse 
represents either of my two alternative measures of diversification, Negative_Count5 and 
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Negative_Count3. Because the creation of this new diversification measure does not 
require as extreme sample restrictions as my main measure, I estimate Equation (2) over 
the GMW Replication sample, with one additional restriction from my Diversification 
sample that the firm be an overall tax avoider. Table 10 presents the results. Overall, 
across three of the four measures of TaxAvoid, the coefficient on TaxAvoid is positive and 
significant, suggesting that tax avoidance increases tax risk. In addition, the coefficient 
on Diverse is negative and significant across three of the founr measures of TaxAvoid, 
suggesting that diversification reduces tax risk, consistent with my first hypothesis. 
However, the coefficients on the interaction term are mixed and statistically insignificant, 
offering no support for my second hypothesis. One issue to note with this measure, 
however, is that although I start with a much larger sample than my Diversification 
sample, due to the poor data population in the directEDGAR Extraction Preprocessed 
tables, my final sample is even smaller than my Diversification sample with only 3,610 
(5,086) observations using the 5-Year (3-Year) measure. Additional hand-collection of 
data is required to increase the sample size.                  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 Consistent with the idea that tax avoidance is risky, the practitioner literature has 
focused on the importance of tax risk management. However, empirically, prior studies 
have generally failed to find a relation between measures of overall firm risk and 
measures of corporate tax avoidance. I propose that one possible reason is that prior 
researchers have failed to consider the role that diversification plays in reducing the risk 
of a portfolio of tax strategies, and thereby reducing overall firm risk. Thus, in this paper, 
I investigate the effect that the number of different tax strategies employed by a public 
company has on the relation between measures of corporate tax avoidance and measures 
of overall firm risk. I develop a measure of the diversification of sources of tax benefits, 
as a proxy for the underlying tax strategies, based on broad categories of book-tax 
differences, and divide my sample into firms with high and low levels of diversification. I 
test my hypotheses by regressing risk on tax avoidance, diversification, and an interaction 
term. When using the standard deviation of future cash ETRs as a measure of tax risk, I 
find weak support that diversification reduces tax risk and mitigates a positive relation 
between tax avoidance and tax risk. I find mixed results when using the standard 
deviation of future monthly stock returns as a measure of overall firm risk. Taken 
together, I contribute to the literature on tax avoidance and tax risk, and add a new 
dimension, diversification, to our thinking of how these two concepts are related.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Diversification Variables 
Diverse_Dummy An indicator variable equal to one if the firm has a high 
level of diversification over 5(3) years, using 
Diverse_Count25 (Diverse_Count15), and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Diverse_Count25 A variable ranging from 1 to 25, counting in how many 
buckets the firm avoided taxes over 5 years (t-4 to t). 
 
Diverse_Count15 A variable ranging from 1 to 15, counting in how many 
buckets the firm avoided taxes over 3 years (t-2 to t).  
 
Negative_Count5 A variable counting the number of negative (tax 
reducing) line items present in the ETR reconciliation 
each year, over 5 years (t-4 to t). 
 
Negative_Count3 A variable counting the number of negative (tax 
reducing) line items present in the ETR reconciliation 
each year, over 3 years (t-2 to t). 
 
Tax Avoidance Variables 
5-Year TaxAvoid The five-year sum (from year t-4 to year t) of cash taxes 
paid (TXPD) divided by the five-year sum of pretax 
income (PI) less special items (SPI), winsorized at 0 and 
1. Firms are required to have a positive denominator. 
Multiplied by negative one to be increasing in tax 
avoidance. 
 
3-Year TaxAvoid The three-year sum (from year t-2 to year t) of cash 
taxes paid (TXPD) divided by the three-year sum of 
pretax income (PI) less special items (SPI), winsorized 
at 0 and 1. Firms are required to have a positive 
denominator. Multiplied by negative one to be 
increasing in tax avoidance. 
 
5-Year Adjusted TaxAvoid The five-year sum (from year t-4 to year t) of cash taxes 
paid (TXPD) divided by the five-year sum of pretax 
income (PI) less special items (SPI), subtracted from the 
same period five-year cash ETR for the portfolio of 
firms in the same quintile of total assets and the same 
industry, to be increasing in tax avoidance.  
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3-Year Adjusted TaxAvoid The three-year sum (from year t-2 to year t) of cash 
taxes paid (TXPD) divided by the three-year sum of 
pretax income (PI) less special items (SPI), subtracted 
from the same period three-year cash ETR for the 
portfolio of firms in the same quintile of total assets and 
the same industry, to be increasing in tax avoidance.  
 
Risk Variables  
FirmRisk (SD_Ret) The standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the 
next year (t+1). 
 
TaxRisk (SD_CETR) The standard deviation of cash taxes paid (TXPD) 
divided by the sum of pretax income (PI) less special 
items (SPI), winsorized at 0 and 1, from t+1 to t+5. 
 
TaxRisk (SD_GAAPETR) The standard deviation of income tax expense (TXT) 
divided by the sum of pretax income (PI) less special 
items (SPI), winsorized at 0 and 1, from t+1 to t+5. 
 
TaxRisk (Tax-Spike 5-Year) Adapted from Saavedra (2018), an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if a firm has a cash tax payment (TXPD) 
equal to at least 60 percent of pretax income (PI) less 
special items (SPI) in any of the future five years, and 
zero otherwise. 
 
TaxRisk (Tax-Spike 3-Year) Adapted from Saavedra (2018), an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if a firm has a cash tax payment (TXPD) 
equal to at least 60 percent of pretax income (PI) less 
special items (SPI) in any of the future three years, and 
zero otherwise. 
 
Control Variables  
PTBI Pretax Income (PI) scaled by prior-period Total Assets 
(AT). 
 
Vol_PTBI The standard deviation of Pretax Income (PI) scaled by 
prior-period Total Assets (AT) from t-4 to t. 
 
BTM Book value of equity (CEQ) over price per share 
(PRCC_F) times total common shares outstanding 
(CSHO). 
 
Leverage Long-Term Debt (DLTT) scaled by prior-period total 
Assets (AT). 
 
Size The natural log of total assets (AT). 
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Shares_Out The log of the firm’s common shares outstanding 
(CSHO). 
 
Vol_SpecialItems The standard deviation of special items (SPI) scaled by 
prior-period total assets (AT) from t-4 to t. 
 
Vol_CashFlow The standard deviation of cash flow (OANCF) scaled by 
prior-period total Assets (AT) from t-4 to t. 
 
Vol_ETBSO The standard deviation of excess tax benefit of stock 
options (TXBCOF + TXBCO) scaled by prior-period 
total assets (AT) from t-4 to t. Set to 0 if missing. 
 
ETBSO The excess tax benefit of stock options (TXBCOF + 
TXBCO) scaled by prior-period total assets (AT). Set to 
0 if missing. 
 
CHG_NOLCF Current year net operating loss carryforward (TLCF) 
less prior year scaled by prior-period total assets (AT). 
Set to 0 if missing  (TLCF). 
 
NOLCF Net operating loss carryforward (TLCF) scaled by prior-
period total assets (AT).Set equal to 0 if missing 
(TLCF). 
 
Loss An indicator variable equal to one if a firm has negative 
pretax income, zero otherwise. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
FIGURES 
 
FIGURE 1 
 
 
 
Note: This figure presents the percentage of firms in the 5-year sample with a tax spike in any of the future 
3 years for each level of diversification. 
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FIGURE 2 
 
 
 
Note: This figure presents the percentage of firms in the 5-year sample with a tax spike in any of the future 
5 years for each level of diversification. 
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FIGURE 3 
 
 
 
Note: This figure presents the percentage of firms in the 3-year sample with a tax spike in any of the future 
3 years for each level of diversification. 
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FIGURE 4 
 
 
 
Note: This figure presents the percentage of firms in the 3-year sample with a tax spike in any of the future 
5 years for each level of diversification. 
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APPENDIX C 
TABLES 
 
TABLE 1 
Sample Selection 
 
 5-Year   3-Year 
    
All Compustat firms (1987–2017) incorporated in the U.S. 274,827   274,827  
Insufficient Data to Calculate:    
 Stock Return Volatility (115,629)  (115,629) 
 Control Variables (85,460)  (85,460) 
 Tax Variable (post-FAS 109) (31,215)  (26,643) 
    
 GMW Replication Sample 42,523   47,095  
    
Insufficient Data to Calculate Diversification Buckets:    
 Negative Pretax Income  (12,894)  (9,671) 
 Current and Deferred Taxes (13,413)  (14,914) 
 Pretax Domestic and Foreign Income (2,841)  (3,328) 
Overall Not Avoiding Tax (1,516)  (2,595) 
    
 Diversification Sample - Firm Risk 11,859   16,587  
    
Insufficient Data to Calculate Future Cash ETR Volatility (4,736)  (6,636) 
    
 Diversification Sample - Tax Risk 7,123  9,951  
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: GMW Replication Sample 
 
Variable 
 
n 
 
Mean 
 Std.    
Dev. 
 25th 
Percentile 
 50th 
Percentile 
 75th 
Percentile 
             
5-Year TaxAvoid  42,523  -0.2703  0.1976  -0.3490  -0.2609  -0.1449 
3-Year TaxAvoid  47,095  -0.2603  0.2022  -0.3480  -0.2507  -0.1181 
5-Year Adjusted TaxAvoid  42,523  -0.0205  0.1750  -0.0699  0.0000  0.0668 
3-Year Adjusted TaxAvoid  47,095  -0.0217  0.1811  -0.0772  0.0000  0.0725 
FirmRisk (SD_Ret)  49,121  0.1139  0.0677  0.0666  0.0968  0.1417 
TaxRisk (SD_CETR)  29,469  0.1358  0.1187  0.0500  0.0973  0.1836 
TaxRisk (SD_GAAPETR)  30,490   0.1183  0.1188  0.0266  0.0773  0.1674 
TaxRisk (Tax-Spike 5-Year)  49,121   0.1620  0.3685  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
TaxRisk (Tax-Spike 3-Year)   49,121   0.1175  0.3220  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
PTBI  49,121  0.0813  0.1106  0.0169  0.0647  0.1308 
Vol_PTBI  49,121  0.0699  0.0811  0.0201  0.0438  0.0869 
BTM  49,121  0.6605  0.5215  0.3222  0.5378  0.8408 
Leverage  49,121  0.2093  0.2235  0.0150  0.1497  0.3248 
Size  49,121  6.5993  1.9790  5.2223  6.5936  7.9066 
Shares_Out  49,121  3.4434  1.4309  2.4371  3.3798  4.3249 
Vol_SpecialItems  49,121  0.0240  0.0398  0.0018  0.0088  0.0271 
Vol_CashFlow  49,121  0.0609  0.0632  0.0217  0.0424  0.0766 
Vol_ETBSO  49,121  0.0006  0.0021  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
ETBSO  49,121  0.0004  0.0018  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
CHG_NOLCF  49,121  0.0017  0.0391  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
LOSS  49,121  0.1409  0.3480  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
             
Note: This table presents the descriptive statistics for the full GMW diversification sample, including observations only present in 
either the 5-year or 3-year sample. All variables are defined in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% levels.  
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics  
 
Panel B: Diversification Sample 
 
Variable 
 
n 
 
Mean 
 Std.    
Dev. 
 25th 
Percentile 
 50th 
Percentile 
 75th 
Percentile 
             
5-Year TaxAvoid  11,859   -0.2216  0.1270  -0.3157  -0.2429  -0.1369 
3-Year TaxAvoid  16,587   -0.2120  0.1371  -0.3111  -0.2280  -0.1020 
5-Year Adjusted TaxAvoid  11,859   0.0074  0.1013  -0.0396  0.0000  0.0515 
3-Year Adjusted TaxAvoid  16,587   0.0097  0.1164  -0.0427  0.0000  0.0648 
FirmRisk (SD_Ret)  17,072   0.0992  0.0546  0.0612  0.0859  0.1219 
TaxRisk (SD_CETR)  10,242   0.1207  0.1123  0.0433  0.0842  0.1597 
TaxRisk (SD_GAAPETR)  10,626   0.0969  0.1094  0.0177  0.0537  0.1415 
TaxRisk (Tax-Spike 5-Year)  17,072   0.1394  0.3463  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
TaxRisk (Tax-Spike 3-Year)  17,072   0.0976  0.2968  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
PTBI  17,072   0.1204  0.0969  0.0520  0.0958  0.1605 
Vol_PTBI  17,072   0.0564  0.0682  0.0188  0.0358  0.0663 
BTM  17,072   0.5385  0.4058  0.2742  0.4482  0.6944 
Leverage  17,072   0.2212  0.2276  0.0120  0.1703  0.3417 
Size  17,072   6.8229  1.9539  5.5312  6.8470  8.1264 
Shares_Out  17,072   3.6522  1.4470  2.6610  3.5937  4.5348 
Vol_SpecialItems  17,072   0.0159  0.0297  0.0015  0.0065  0.0170 
Vol_CashFlow  17,072   0.0552  0.0570  0.0212  0.0386  0.0680 
Vol_ETBSO  17,072   0.0009  0.0025  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
ETBSO  17,072   0.0007  0.0023  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
CHG_NOLCF  17,072   -0.0004  0.0313  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
             
Note: This table presents the descriptive statistics for the full diversification sample, including observations only present in either 
the 5-year or 3-year sample. All variables are defined in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels.  
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics  
 
Panel C: Industry Composition 
 
   
GMW Replication 
Sample  
Diversification 
Sample 
Fama-French Industry Code  n  Percent  n  Percent 
          
1 Agriculture  151  0.31  66  0.39 
2 Food Products  966  1.97  393  2.3 
3 Candy & Soda  123  0.25  71  0.42 
4 Beer & Liquor  170  0.35  96  0.56 
5 Tobacco Products  53  0.11  39  0.23 
6 Recreation  363  0.74  121  0.71 
7 Entertainment  630  1.28  178  1.04 
8 Printing and Publishing  362  0.74  141  0.82 
9 Consumer Goods  824  1.68  297  1.74 
10 Apparel  798  1.62  254  1.49 
11 Healthcare  830  1.69  359  2.1 
12 Medical Equipment  1,364  2.78  489  2.87 
13 Pharmaceutical Products  1,229  2.5  407  2.38 
14 Chemicals  1,065  2.17  429  2.51 
15 Rubber and Plastic Products  451  0.92  148  0.87 
16 Textiles  201  0.41  72  0.42 
17 Construction Materials  1,060  2.16  423  2.48 
18 Construction  627  1.28  223  1.31 
19 Steel Works  630  1.28  202  1.18 
20 Fabricated Products  168  0.34  36  0.21 
21 Machinery  1,798  3.66  702  4.11 
22 Electrical Equipment  735  1.5  191  1.12 
23 Automobiles and Trucks  791  1.61  294  1.72 
24 Aircraft  270  0.55  144  0.84 
25 Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment  130  0.26  46  0.27 
26 Defense  135  0.27  71  0.42 
27 Precious Metals  53  0.11  6  0.04 
28 Non-Metallic & Industrial Metal Mining  149  0.3  53  0.31 
29 Coal  79  0.16  43  0.25 
30 Petroleum and Natural Gas  1,427  2.91  408  2.39 
31 Utilities  2,097  4.27  216  1.27 
32 Communication  986  2.01  366  2.14 
33 Personal Services  576  1.17  258  1.51 
34 Business Services  2,559  5.21  866  5.07 
35 Computer Hardware  879  1.79  284  1.66 
36 Computer Software  2,738  5.57  983  5.76 
37 Electronic Equipment  2,712  5.52  895  5.24 
38 Measuring and Control Equipment  1,104  2.25  403  2.36 
39 Business Supplies  652  1.33  262  1.53 
40 Shipping Containers  203  0.41  88  0.52 
41 Transportation  1,229  2.5  608  3.56 
42 Wholesale  1,950  3.97  761  4.46 
43 Retail  2,756  5.61  1,157  6.78 
44 Restaurants, Hotels, Motels  955  1.94  302  1.77 
45 Banking  3,593  7.31  259  1.52 
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TABLE 2, Panel C (continued) 
 
 
   
GMW Replication 
Sample  
Diversification 
Sample 
Fama-French Industry Code  n  Percent  n  Percent 
          
46 Insurance  1,816  3.7  660  3.87 
47 Real Estate  344  0.7  104  0.61 
48 Trading  3,497  7.12  1,946  11.4 
49 Other  843  1.72  252  1.48 
          
 Total  49,121  100  17,072  100 
Note: This table presents the industry composition for the full diversification sample and GMW 
replication sample, including observations in only present either the 5-year or 3-year sample. Industry 
composition is based on Fama-French 49 groupings.  
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TABLE 3 
The Relation between Tax Avoidance and Measures of Risk 
 
 
GMW Replication Sample - 
Firm Risk (SD_Ret)  
Diversification Sample - 
Firm Risk (SD_Ret)  
Diversification Sample - 
Tax Risk (SD_CETR) 
 
(1) 
5-Year 
TaxAvoid 
(2) 
3-Year 
Adjusted 
TaxAvoid 
(3) 
5-Year 
TaxAvoid 
(4) 
3-Year 
Adjusted 
TaxAvoid 
 
(5) 
5-Year 
TaxAvoid 
(6) 
3-Year 
Adjusted 
TaxAvoid 
         
TaxAvoid -0.0037 -0.0003  0.0095 0.0079  0.0575 0.0272 
 (-1.46) (-0.15)  (1.09) (1.57)  (1.59) (1.64)          
PTBI 0.0013 0.0041  0.0197** 0.0239***  -0.0192 -0.0002 
 (0.24) (0.82)  (2.02) (2.90)  (-0.76) (-0.01)          
Vol_PTBI 0.0734*** 0.0609***  0.0920*** 0.0433**  -0.0313 -0.0475 
 (6.26) (5.79)  (3.49) (2.40)  (-0.55) (-1.07)          
BTM 0.0195*** 0.0189***  0.0127*** 0.0146***  -0.0047 -0.0062 
 (14.48) (14.14)  (4.06) (5.70)  (-0.58) (-0.93)          
Leverage 0.0245*** 0.0235***  0.0203*** 0.0188***  0.0185 -0.0036 
 (9.61) (10.15)  (4.69) (5.26)  (1.60) (-0.35)          
Size -0.0060*** -0.0061***  -0.0029 -0.0038**  0.0130* 0.0160*** 
 (-4.84) (-5.39)  (-1.36) (-2.34)  (1.73) (2.82)          
Shares_Out 0.0003 0.0004  0.0035* 0.0022  0.0111 0.0085 
 (0.22) (0.40)  (1.76) (1.39)  (1.56) (1.39)          
Vol_SpecialItems 0.0319* 0.0247  -0.0042 -0.0027  0.0335 -0.0221 
 (1.81) (1.53)  (-0.10) (-0.10)  (0.20) (-0.29)          
Vol_CashFlow 0.0090 0.0190*  -0.0010 0.0321*  -0.0809 -0.0892 
 (0.73) (1.76)  (-0.04) (1.81)  (-1.19) (-1.64) 
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
 
 
GMW Replication Sample - 
Firm Risk (SD_Ret)  
Diversification Sample - 
Firm Risk (SD_Ret)  
Diversification Sample - 
Tax Risk (SD_CETR) 
 
(1) 
5-Year 
TaxAvoid 
(2) 
3-Year 
Adjusted 
TaxAvoid 
 (3) 
5-Year 
TaxAvoid 
(4) 
3-Year 
Adjusted 
TaxAvoid 
 (5) 
5-Year 
TaxAvoid 
(6) 
3-Year 
Adjusted 
TaxAvoid          
Vol_ETBSO -1.4570*** -1.4875***  -1.4273*** -1.1705***  -0.4891 -0.3933 
 (-6.82) (-6.82)  (-4.64) (-4.14)  (-0.57) (-0.50)          
ETBSO 0.3107* 0.2577  -0.2341 -0.3499  -0.6603 -0.6730 
 (1.95) (1.63)  (-1.00) (-1.63)  (-1.27) (-1.28)          
CHG_NOLCF 0.0319*** 0.0149*  0.0130 0.0009  -0.1151** -0.0758** 
 (3.78) (1.87)  (0.72) (0.06)  (-2.26) (-1.96)          
NOLCF -0.0072* -0.0038  0.0128 0.0132**  0.0355 0.0034 
 (-1.65) (-0.98)  (1.37) (2.08)  (1.06) (0.14)          
Loss 0.0205*** 0.0202***  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
 (16.26) (16.46)  (.) (.)  (.) (.)          
Constant 0.1387*** 0.1160***  0.1073*** 0.0911***  0.0129 0.0005 
 (20.64) (19.74)  (8.67) (10.51)  (0.31) (0.02)          
N 42,523 47,095  11,859 16,587  7,123 9,951 
Adj. R-sq 0.2734 0.2637  0.2480 0.2472  0.0236 0.0245 
Note: This table presents the results from estimating Equation (1). I use OLS with firm and year fixed effects and cluster 
standard errors at the firm level. The symbols *, **, and *** denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively.
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TABLE 4 
Diversification Descriptives 
 
Panel A: 5-Year Measure                                                                                        
 
Diverse_Count25 n Percent Cum. 
2 1 0.01 0.01 
3 3 0.03 0.03 
4 12 0.10 0.13 
5 152 1.28 1.42 
6 109 0.92 2.34 
7 232 1.96 4.29 
8 390 3.29 7.58 
9 574 4.84 12.42 
10 2,100 17.71 30.13 
11 1,025 8.64 38.77 
12 1,196 10.09 48.86 
13 1,205 10.16 59.02 
14 1,091 9.20 68.22 
15 920 7.76 75.98 
16 484 4.08 80.06 
17 481 4.06 84.11 
18 461 3.89 88.00 
19 437 3.68 91.69 
20 357 3.01 94.70 
21 247 2.08 96.78 
22 186 1.57 98.35 
23 110 0.93 99.27 
24 54 0.46 99.73 
25 32 0.27 100.00 
Total 11,860 100  
Average 13.18   
Note: This table presents the number of observations 
at each level of diversification using the 5-year 
measure. There are no observations for level 1. 
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TABLE 4 
Diversification Descriptives  
 
Panel B: 3-Year Measure 
 
Diverse_Count15 n Percent Cum. 
1 6 0.04 0.04 
2 30 0.18 0.22 
3 344 2.07 2.29 
4 528 3.18 5.47 
5 1,071 6.46 11.93 
6 3,653 22.02 33.95 
7 2,486 14.99 48.94 
8 2,555 15.40 64.35 
9 2,252 13.58 77.92 
10 1,074 6.47 84.40 
11 936 5.64 90.04 
12 807 4.87 94.91 
13 471 2.84 97.75 
14 246 1.48 99.23 
15 128 0.77 100.00 
Total 16,587 100  
Average 7.89   
Note: This table presents the number of 
observations at each level of diversification using 
the 3-year measure. 
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TABLE 5 
The Impact of Diversification on the Relation between Tax Avoidance and Tax Risk 
 
Panel A: Continuous Measures of Diversification 
 
 Tax Risk (SD_CETR) 
 
5-Year 
TaxAvoid 
5-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
 
3-Year 
TaxAvoid 
3-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
      
TaxAvoid 0.2307** 0.1493**  0.0878 0.0929* 
 (2.20) (1.97)  (1.60) (1.92)       
Diverse -0.0054** -0.0021**  -0.0035** -0.0011 
 (-2.55) (-2.21)  (-1.97) (-1.08)       
Diverse x TaxAvoid -0.0124* -0.0079  -0.0105* -0.0084 
 (-1.75) (-1.50)  (-1.68) (-1.51)       
PTBI -0.0163 -0.0158  0.0016 0.0016 
 (-0.65) (-0.63)  (0.08) (0.08)       
Vol_PTBI -0.0251 -0.0312  -0.0476 -0.0489 
 (-0.44) (-0.54)  (-1.08) (-1.10)       
BTM -0.0043 -0.0044  -0.0061 -0.0062 
 (-0.54) (-0.54)  (-0.92) (-0.93)       
Leverage 0.0176 0.0171  -0.0025 -0.0034 
 (1.51) (1.46)  (-0.24) (-0.34)       
Size 0.0146* 0.0149**  0.0161*** 0.0164*** 
 (1.96) (2.00)  (2.87) (2.89)       
Shares_Out 0.0107 0.0103  0.0086 0.0084 
 (1.52) (1.46)  (1.42) (1.39)       
Vol_SpecialItems -0.0056 -0.0019  -0.0266 -0.0238 
 (-0.03) (-0.01)  (-0.35) (-0.32)       
Vol_CashFlow -0.0849 -0.0829  -0.0881 -0.0898* 
 (-1.26) (-1.23)  (-1.62) (-1.65)       
Vol_ETBSO -0.3946 -0.3337  -0.4235 -0.3745 
 (-0.45) (-0.38)  (-0.54) (-0.48)       
ETBSO -0.6519 -0.6370  -0.6230 -0.6456 
 (-1.25) (-1.22)  (-1.18) (-1.23)       
CHG_NOLCF -0.1010** -0.1086**  -0.0775** -0.0740* 
 (-2.00) (-2.15)  (-1.99) (-1.91)       
NOLCF 0.0316 0.0355  0.0030 0.0015 
 (0.95) (1.08)  (0.12) (0.06) 
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TABLE 5, Panel A (continued) 
 
 Tax Risk (SD_CETR) 
 
5-Year 
TaxAvoid 
5-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
 3-Year 
TaxAvoid 
3-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
      
Constant 0.0746 0.0131  0.0276 0.0063 
 (1.42) (0.32)  (0.85) (0.22) 
      
N 7,123 7,123  9,951 9,951 
Adj. R-sq 0.0286 0.0270  0.0247 0.0254 
Note: I use OLS with firm and year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the firm 
level. The symbols *, **, and *** denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 5  
The Impact of Diversification on the Relation between Tax Avoidance and Tax Risk 
 
Panel B: Indicator Variable Measures of Diversification 
 
 Tax Risk (SD_CETR) 
 
5-Year 
TaxAvoid 
5-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
 
3-Year 
TaxAvoid 
3-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
      
TaxAvoid 0.0640* 0.0499*  0.0195 0.0380* 
 (1.72) (1.75)  (0.87) (1.95)       
Diverse -0.0247 -0.0139**  -0.0140* -0.0042 
 (-1.59) (-2.38)  (-1.96) (-1.22)       
Diverse x TaxAvoid -0.0433 -0.0557  -0.0419* -0.0310 
 (-0.73) (-1.21)  (-1.65) (-1.27)       
PTBI -0.0180 -0.0175  0.0015 0.0014 
 (-0.71) (-0.69)  (0.07) (0.07)       
Vol_PTBI -0.0308 -0.0321  -0.0480 -0.0481 
 (-0.54) (-0.56)  (-1.09) (-1.08)       
BTM -0.0046 -0.0044  -0.0061 -0.0062 
 (-0.57) (-0.55)  (-0.93) (-0.93)       
Leverage 0.0189 0.0183  -0.0028 -0.0035 
 (1.64) (1.58)  (-0.28) (-0.34)       
Size 0.0135* 0.0138*  0.0160*** 0.0162*** 
 (1.80) (1.84)  (2.84) (2.87)       
Shares_Out 0.0110 0.0107  0.0088 0.0086 
 (1.55) (1.51)  (1.44) (1.41)       
Vol_SpecialItems 0.0154 0.0111  -0.0246 -0.0224 
 (0.09) (0.07)  (-0.32) (-0.30)       
Vol_CashFlow -0.0786 -0.0792  -0.0857 -0.0882 
 (-1.16) (-1.18)  (-1.57) (-1.61)       
Vol_ETBSO -0.4625 -0.4332  -0.4037 -0.3590 
 (-0.54) (-0.50)  (-0.51) (-0.46)       
ETBSO -0.6203 -0.5926  -0.6558 -0.6698 
 (-1.19) (-1.14)  (-1.24) (-1.27)       
CHG_NOLCF -0.1111** -0.1153**  -0.0768** -0.0734* 
 (-2.19) (-2.28)  (-1.98) (-1.90)       
NOLCF 0.0364 0.0394  0.0038 0.0022 
 (1.10) (1.20)  (0.15) (0.09) 
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TABLE 5, Panel B (continued)  
 
 Tax Risk (SD_CETR) 
 
5-Year 
TaxAvoid 
5-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
 3-Year 
TaxAvoid 
3-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
      
Constant 0.0121 -0.0058  0.0053 -0.0003 
 (0.29) (-0.15)  (0.18) (-0.01) 
      
N 7,123 7,123  9,951 9,951 
Adj. R-sq 0.0258 0.0255  0.0244 0.0251 
Note: I use OLS with firm and year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the firm 
level. The symbols *, **, and *** denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 6 
The Impact of Diversification on the Relation between Levels of Tax Avoidance and Tax 
Risk 
 
 Tax Risk (SD_CETR) 
 
5-Year 
TaxAvoid 
Low 
5-Year 
TaxAvoid 
Medium 
5-Year 
TaxAvoid 
High 
    
TaxAvoid -0.1240 0.3843 0.5230 
 (-0.38) (1.34) (1.53)     
Diverse 0.0095 -0.0050 -0.0089*** 
 (1.08) (-1.04) (-2.59)     
Diverse x TaxAvoid 0.0342 -0.0246 -0.0348 
 (1.34) (-1.42) (-1.59)     
PTBI -0.0310 -0.0137 0.0692 
 (-0.79) (-0.32) (1.55)     
Vol_PTBI -0.0495 -0.0590 0.0544 
 (-0.52) (-0.56) (0.55)     
BTM 0.0097 -0.0088 -0.0030 
 (0.56) (-0.73) (-0.30)     
Leverage 0.0270 0.0420** -0.0200 
 (1.16) (1.97) (-1.21)     
Size 0.0055 0.0152 0.0144 
 (0.36) (1.19) (1.35)     
Shares_Out 0.0206** -0.0103 0.0025 
 (2.00) (-0.91) (0.24)     
Vol_SpecialItems 0.0766 -0.0800 0.1554 
 (0.42) (-0.19) (0.43)     
Vol_CashFlow 0.0268 -0.2253 -0.1741 
 (0.22) (-1.61) (-1.55)     
Vol_ETBSO -1.9807 0.1325 2.4743 
 (-1.14) (0.14) (1.44)     
ETBSO -1.5492 -0.0800 -1.0973 
 (-1.30) (-0.11) (-1.25)     
CHG_NOLCF -0.4482*** 0.0109 -0.0681 
 (-2.60) (0.11) (-1.05)     
NOLCF 0.2145** -0.0629 0.0072 
 (2.02) (-0.81) (0.22) 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
 
 Tax Risk (SD_CETR) 
 
5-Year 
TaxAvoid 
Low 
5-Year 
TaxAvoid 
Medium 
5-Year 
TaxAvoid 
High 
    
Constant 0.0056 0.1654 0.0868 
 (0.04) (1.35) (1.32) 
    
N 2,374 2,374 2,375 
Adj. R-sq 0.0845 0.0322 0.0372 
Note: I use OLS with firm and year fixed effects and cluster standard 
errors at the firm level. The symbols *, **, and *** denote two-tailed 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 7 
The Impact of Diversification on the Relation between Tax Avoidance and Firm Risk 
 
Panel A: Continuous Measures of Diversification 
 
 Firm Risk (SD_Ret) 
 
5-Year 
TaxAvoid 
5-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
 
3-Year 
TaxAvoid 
3-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
      
TaxAvoid -0.0200 0.0099  -0.0346** -0.0255 
 (-0.72) (0.41)  (-2.18) (-1.56)       
Diverse 0.0001 -0.0006***  0.0004 -0.0008*** 
 (0.09) (-2.71)  (0.78) (-3.07)       
Diverse x TaxAvoid 0.0025 0.0012  0.0049*** 0.0047** 
 (1.36) (0.72)  (2.66) (2.45)       
PTBI 0.0210** 0.0213**  0.0251*** 0.0256*** 
 (2.15) (2.19)  (3.03) (3.10)       
Vol_PTBI 0.0916*** 0.0919***  0.0431** 0.0429** 
 (3.48) (3.51)  (2.39) (2.38)       
BTM 0.0128*** 0.0129***  0.0144*** 0.0146*** 
 (4.08) (4.13)  (5.64) (5.73)       
Leverage 0.0201*** 0.0196***  0.0189*** 0.0188*** 
 (4.67) (4.57)  (5.30) (5.28)       
Size -0.0025 -0.0023  -0.0035** -0.0035** 
 (-1.15) (-1.06)  (-2.20) (-2.16)       
Shares_Out 0.0033* 0.0032*  0.0022 0.0022 
 (1.70) (1.66)  (1.39) (1.39)       
Vol_SpecialItems -0.0086 -0.0071  -0.0041 -0.0035 
 (-0.20) (-0.17)  (-0.15) (-0.13)       
Vol_CashFlow -0.0012 -0.0024  0.0320* 0.0314* 
 (-0.05) (-0.10)  (1.80) (1.77)       
Vol_ETBSO -1.4160*** -1.3919***  -1.1717*** -1.1759*** 
 (-4.63) (-4.53)  (-4.18) (-4.19)       
ETBSO -0.2414 -0.2225  -0.3543* -0.3388 
 (-1.04) (-0.96)  (-1.65) (-1.57)       
CHG_NOLCF 0.0133 0.0159  -0.0008 0.0009 
 (0.74) (0.89)  (-0.05) (0.06)       
NOLCF 0.0117 0.0113  0.0135** 0.0128** 
 (1.27) (1.23)  (2.12) (2.03) 
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TABLE 7, Panel A (continued) 
 
 Firm Risk (SD_Ret) 
 
5-Year 
TaxAvoid 
5-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
 3-Year 
TaxAvoid 
3-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
      
Constant 0.1047*** 0.1089***  0.0872*** 0.0950*** 
 (7.61) (8.79)  (9.19) (10.84) 
      
N 11,859 11,859  16,587 16,587 
Adj. R-sq 0.2487 0.2498  0.2480 0.2483 
Note: I use OLS with firm and year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the firm level. 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 7  
The Impact of Diversification on the Relation between Tax Avoidance and Firm Risk 
 
Panel B: Indicator Variable Measures of Diversification 
 
 Firm Risk (SD_Ret) 
 
5-Year 
TaxAvoid 
5-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
 
3-Year 
TaxAvoid 
3-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
      
TaxAvoid 0.0089 0.0226***  -0.0037 0.0038 
 (0.99) (2.94)  (-0.61) (0.64)       
Diverse 0.0005 -0.0033**  0.0016 -0.0025** 
 (0.14) (-2.05)  (0.76) (-2.35)       
Diverse x TaxAvoid 0.0154 0.0111  0.0165** 0.0177** 
 (1.02) (0.80)  (2.10) (2.11)       
PTBI 0.0203** 0.0206**  0.0241*** 0.0246*** 
 (2.08) (2.12)  (2.91) (2.97)       
Vol_PTBI 0.0917*** 0.0916***  0.0436** 0.0432** 
 (3.48) (3.49)  (2.41) (2.39)       
BTM 0.0127*** 0.0128***  0.0144*** 0.0146*** 
 (4.06) (4.10)  (5.65) (5.73)       
Leverage 0.0204*** 0.0199***  0.0191*** 0.0188*** 
 (4.72) (4.64)  (5.35) (5.31)       
Size -0.0029 -0.0027  -0.0037** -0.0036** 
 (-1.34) (-1.25)  (-2.30) (-2.26)       
Shares_Out 0.0034* 0.0033*  0.0022 0.0022 
 (1.75) (1.70)  (1.39) (1.38)       
Vol_SpecialItems -0.0072 -0.0039  -0.0036 -0.0030 
 (-0.17) (-0.09)  (-0.13) (-0.11)       
Vol_CashFlow -0.0010 -0.0019  0.0320* 0.0318* 
 (-0.04) (-0.08)  (1.80) (1.79)       
Vol_ETBSO -1.4272*** -1.4012***  -1.1802*** -1.1858*** 
 (-4.64) (-4.56)  (-4.21) (-4.22)       
ETBSO -0.2284 -0.2182  -0.3521 -0.3444 
 (-0.98) (-0.94)  (-1.64) (-1.60)       
CHG_NOLCF 0.0132 0.0156  -0.0009 0.0008 
 (0.73) (0.87)  (-0.06) (0.05)       
NOLCF 0.0125 0.0122  0.0138** 0.0131** 
 (1.34) (1.30)  (2.16) (2.07) 
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TABLE 7, Panel B (continued) 
 
 Firm Risk (SD_Ret) 
 
5-Year 
TaxAvoid 
5-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
 3-Year 
TaxAvoid 
3-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
      
Constant 0.1071*** 0.1037***  0.0906*** 0.0908*** 
 (8.65) (8.41)  (10.50) (10.50) 
      
N 11,859 11,859  16,587 16,587 
Adj. R-sq 0.2482 0.2493  0.2475 0.2478 
Note: I use OLS with firm and year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the firm level. 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 8 
The Impact of Diversification on the Relation between Tax Avoidance and Tax Risk (Tax 
Spikes) 
 
Panel A: 3-Year Measure  
 
 Tax Risk (Tax-Spike 3-Year) 
 
5-Year 
TaxAvoid 
5-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
 
3-Year 
TaxAvoid 
3-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
      
TaxAvoid 0.6077** 0.3212  0.3596** 0.3216** 
 (2.26) (1.64)  (2.51) (2.52)       
Diverse -0.0109** -0.0036  -0.0099** -0.0006 
 (-2.18) (-1.58)  (-2.27) (-0.24)       
Diverse x TaxAvoid -0.0282 -0.0082  -0.0397** -0.0292* 
 (-1.55) (-0.60)  (-2.38) (-1.95)       
PTBI -0.0773 -0.0763  -0.0467 -0.0465 
 (-1.05) (-1.05)  (-0.82) (-0.81)       
Vol_PTBI -0.0907 -0.1048  -0.1690 -0.1706 
 (-0.58) (-0.67)  (-1.51) (-1.52)       
BTM -0.0151 -0.0145  -0.0030 -0.0032 
 (-0.74) (-0.71)  (-0.19) (-0.20)       
Leverage 0.0530* 0.0502*  0.0284 0.0261 
 (1.86) (1.76)  (1.15) (1.06)       
Size 0.0422** 0.0436**  0.0371*** 0.0384*** 
 (2.42) (2.49)  (2.92) (3.01)       
Shares_Out 0.0109 0.0103  0.0003 -0.0004 
 (0.61) (0.58)  (0.03) (-0.03)       
Vol_SpecialItems 0.4884 0.5081  0.0263 0.0306 
 (1.31) (1.36)  (0.16) (0.18)       
Vol_CashFlow -0.0720 -0.0622  -0.0264 -0.0266 
 (-0.41) (-0.35)  (-0.19) (-0.19)       
Vol_ETBSO 0.0557 0.3668  -0.5218 -0.4418 
 (0.03) (0.17)  (-0.26) (-0.22)       
ETBSO -1.1985 -1.0805  0.5969 0.5029 
 (-0.78) (-0.70)  (0.43) (0.36)       
CHG_NOLCF 0.0042 -0.0142  0.0595 0.0642 
 (0.03) (-0.11)  (0.65) (0.71)       
NOLCF -0.0182 -0.0070  -0.0611 -0.0620 
 (-0.22) (-0.09)  (-1.12) (-1.16) 
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TABLE 8, Panel A (continued) 
 
 Tax Risk (Tax-Spike 3-Year) 
 
5-Year 
TaxAvoid 
5-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
 3-Year 
TaxAvoid 
3-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
      
Constant 0.0084 -0.1565*  -0.0197 -0.1104* 
 (0.08) (-1.72)  (-0.30) (-1.80) 
      
N 11,859 11,859  16,587 16,587 
Adj. R-sq 0.0154 0.0149  0.0119 0.0122 
Note: I use OLS with firm and year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the firm 
level. The symbols *, **, and *** denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 8  
The Impact of Diversification on the Relation between Tax Avoidance and Tax Risk (Tax 
Spikes) 
 
Panel B: 5-Year Measure 
 
   Tax Risk (Tax-Spike 5-Year) 
 
5-Year 
TaxAvoid 
5-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
 
3-Year 
TaxAvoid 
3-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
      
TaxAvoid 0.4322 0.2807  0.3147** 0.3218** 
 (1.46) (1.32)  (2.04) (2.35)       
Diverse -0.0080 -0.0035  -0.0099** -0.0024 
 (-1.43) (-1.40)  (-2.03) (-0.85)       
Diverse x TaxAvoid -0.0161 -0.0096  -0.0320* -0.0277* 
 (-0.80) (-0.63)  (-1.79) (-1.76)       
PTBI -0.0166 -0.0177  0.0147 0.0147 
 (-0.22) (-0.23)  (0.23) (0.23)       
Vol_PTBI -0.1094 -0.1218  -0.2091 -0.2106 
 (-0.61) (-0.68)  (-1.62) (-1.63)       
BTM -0.0192 -0.0187  -0.0255 -0.0255 
 (-0.90) (-0.88)  (-1.46) (-1.46)       
Leverage 0.0238 0.0223  0.0071 0.0050 
 (0.81) (0.76)  (0.27) (0.19)       
Size 0.0683*** 0.0689***  0.0643*** 0.0654*** 
 (3.26) (3.29)  (4.05) (4.11)       
Shares_Out 0.0130 0.0130  0.0064 0.0058 
 (0.61) (0.62)  (0.36) (0.33)       
Vol_SpecialItems 0.4818 0.4853  0.1182 0.1230 
 (1.19) (1.18)  (0.61) (0.63)       
Vol_CashFlow -0.1004 -0.0881  -0.0755 -0.0755 
 (-0.50) (-0.44)  (-0.47) (-0.47)       
Vol_ETBSO 0.6773 0.9487  1.5445 1.6263 
 (0.31) (0.43)  (0.70) (0.73)       
ETBSO -0.5940 -0.4770  0.6924 0.6345 
 (-0.38) (-0.31)  (0.48) (0.44)       
CHG_NOLCF -0.0592 -0.0806  -0.0234 -0.0190 
 (-0.43) (-0.58)  (-0.24) (-0.20)       
NOLCF -0.0231 -0.0098  -0.0693 -0.0699 
 (-0.26) (-0.11)  (-1.11) (-1.14) 
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TABLE 8, Panel B (continued) 
 
 Tax Risk (Tax-Spike 5-Year) 
 
5-Year 
TaxAvoid 
5-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
 3-Year 
TaxAvoid 
3-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
      
Constant -0.1397 -0.2593**  -0.1064 -0.1869** 
 (-1.10) (-2.42)  (-1.30) (-2.41) 
      
N 11,859 11,859  16,587 16,587 
Adj. R-sq 0.0231 0.0222  0.0225 0.0231 
Note: I use OLS with firm and year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the firm 
level. The symbols *, **, and *** denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 9 
The Impact of Diversification on the Relation between Tax Avoidance and Tax Risk (GAAP 
ETR Vol.) 
   
 Tax Risk (SD_GAAPETR) 
 
5-Year 
TaxAvoid 
5-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
 
3-Year 
TaxAvoid 
3-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
      
TaxAvoid -0.0631 -0.0438  0.0540 0.0495 
 (-0.71) (-0.72)  (1.04) (1.14)       
Diverse -0.0004 -0.0010  -0.0031* -0.0010 
 (-0.22) (-1.26)  (-1.77) (-1.15)       
Diverse x TaxAvoid 0.0023 0.0006  -0.0095 -0.0062 
 (0.37) (0.13)  (-1.49) (-1.17)       
PTBI -0.0535** -0.0541**  -0.0459** -0.0450** 
 (-2.50) (-2.53)  (-2.47) (-2.41)       
Vol_PTBI -0.0092 -0.0084  -0.0735* -0.0746* 
 (-0.19) (-0.17)  (-1.87) (-1.90)       
BTM 0.0172** 0.0170**  0.0155*** 0.0154*** 
 (2.49) (2.48)  (2.95) (2.92)       
Leverage -0.0062 -0.0054  -0.0124 -0.0134 
 (-0.69) (-0.61)  (-1.52) (-1.63)       
Size 0.0132* 0.0130*  0.0179*** 0.0184*** 
 (1.92) (1.90)  (3.43) (3.49)       
Shares_Out 0.0067 0.0070  0.0014 0.0011 
 (1.02) (1.06)  (0.25) (0.19)       
Vol_SpecialItems -0.2176* -0.2206**  -0.2033*** -0.2014*** 
 (-1.95) (-1.97)  (-3.04) (-3.02)       
Vol_CashFlow 0.0175 0.0181  0.0071 0.0063 
 (0.35) (0.36)  (0.16) (0.14)       
Vol_ETBSO -0.4860 -0.5328  -0.3892 -0.3386 
 (-0.79) (-0.87)  (-0.68) (-0.59)       
ETBSO -0.1353 -0.1546  -0.0983 -0.1438 
 (-0.28) (-0.32)  (-0.21) (-0.30)       
CHG_NOLCF -0.0027 -0.0014  -0.0029 0.0018 
 (-0.06) (-0.03)  (-0.09) (0.05)       
NOLCF 0.0266 0.0256  0.0284 0.0263 
 (0.79) (0.76)  (1.26) (1.16) 
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TABLE 9 (continued) 
 
 Tax Risk (SD_GAAPETR) 
 
5-Year 
TaxAvoid 
5-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
 3-Year 
TaxAvoid 
3-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
      
Constant -0.0331 -0.0166  -0.0182 -0.0314 
 (-0.72) (-0.45)  (-0.58) (-1.15) 
      
N 7,385 7,385  10,329 10,329 
Adj. R-sq 0.0684 0.0689  0.0608 0.0600 
Note: I use OLS with firm and year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the firm 
level. The symbols *, **, and *** denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 10 
The Impact of Diversification (Alternative Measure) on the Relation between Tax 
Avoidance and Tax Risk 
   
 Tax Risk (SD_CETR) 
 
5-Year 
TaxAvoid 
5-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
 
3-Year 
TaxAvoid 
3-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
      
TaxAvoid 0.0507* 0.0654**  0.0167 0.0466** 
 (1.84) (2.31)  (0.75) (2.10) 
      
Diverse -0.0044*** -0.0041***  -0.0022 -0.0026** 
 (-3.00) (-3.26)  (-1.42) (-2.15) 
      
Diverse x TaxAvoid -0.0014 -0.0033  0.0019 -0.0028 
 (-0.56) (-1.26)  (0.48) (-0.66) 
      
PTBI 0.0301 0.0288  0.0209 0.0193 
 (0.96) (0.91)  (0.79) (0.73) 
      
Vol_PTBI -0.1542 -0.1571  -0.1025 -0.1014 
 (-1.58) (-1.61)  (-1.33) (-1.32) 
      
BTM -0.0100 -0.0097  -0.0142** -0.0139** 
 (-1.42) (-1.39)  (-2.30) (-2.26) 
      
Leverage -0.0092 -0.0099  -0.0124 -0.0122 
 (-0.58) (-0.63)  (-0.89) (-0.88) 
      
Size 0.0472*** 0.0477***  0.0441*** 0.0438*** 
 (4.44) (4.49)  (5.03) (4.99) 
      
Shares_Out -0.0078 -0.0087  -0.0019 -0.0022 
 (-1.38) (-1.55)  (-0.31) (-0.36) 
      
Vol_SpecialItems 0.1511 0.1500  0.0957 0.0920 
 (1.23) (1.22)  (0.88) (0.84) 
      
Vol_CashFlow -0.1176 -0.1164  -0.0655 -0.0630 
 (-1.30) (-1.30)  (-0.82) (-0.79) 
      
Vol_ETBSO -1.2285 -1.1636  -1.1401 -1.0833 
 (-1.14) (-1.09)  (-1.33) (-1.27) 
      
ETBSO -0.3931 -0.3933  -0.0753 -0.0648 
 (-0.60) (-0.61)  (-0.13) (-0.11) 
      
CHG_NOLCF -0.0111 -0.0113  -0.0101 -0.0078 
 (-0.32) (-0.33)  (-0.34) (-0.26) 
      
NOLCF 0.0063 0.0061  -0.0241 -0.0238 
 (0.18) (0.17)  (-0.98) (-0.98) 
      
LOSS -0.0081 -0.0084  -0.0061 -0.0064 
 (-1.11) (-1.16)  (-0.92) (-0.96) 
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TABLE 10 (continued) 
 
 Tax Risk (SD_CETR) 
 
5-Year 
TaxAvoid 
5-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
 3-Year 
TaxAvoid 
3-Year Adj. 
TaxAvoid 
      
Constant -0.0957 -0.1075  -0.1030* -0.1048* 
 (-1.31) (-1.48)  (-1.76) (-1.79) 
      
N 3,610 3,610  5,086 5,086 
Adj. R-sq 0.0665 0.0667  0.0559 0.0568 
Note: I use OLS with firm and year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the firm 
level. The symbols *, **, and *** denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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